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ESCHEWING ERSATZ PERCENTAGES: A SIMPLIFIED 
VOCABULARY OF COMPARATIVE FAULT 
DAVID W. ROBERTSON* 
I.  THE CORE IDEA OF COMPARATIVE FAULT 
A jurisdiction that opts for abandoning the contributory negligence regime 
and instituting a system treating victim fault on a comparative basis must face 
dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of difficult questions,1 such as whether to 
adopt the pure form of comparative fault or some modified version,2 whether 
to allocate responsibility among multiple tortfeasors on a comparative basis,3 
and whether (and if so, how) the comparative system applies in liability fields 
other than negligence.4  But the core idea of the comparative fault approach is 
 
* W. Page Keeton Chair in Tort Law, University of Texas.  I am grateful to Joel Goldstein for 
inviting me to participate in this symposium and to David Anderson, Hans Baade, Mark Gergen, 
Richard Markovitz and Bill Powers for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (2000) 
[hereinafter APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT]; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1994); HENRY WOODS & BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT (3d ed. 
1996). 
 2. The pure form allows plaintiffs to recover damages regardless of their degree of fault.  
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976).  Modified forms provide that plaintiffs are 
barred from recovery when their fault exceeds a certain level.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-
64-122 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993) (barring recovery when the victim’s fault is “equal to or 
greater in degree” than the tortfeasor’s); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1999) (barring recovery 
when the victim’s fault is “greater than” the tortfeasor’s). 
 3. See Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679, 688 (W. Va. 1982) (stating 
that the decision to compare the fault of victims and tortfeasors “lead[s] ineluctably” to 
comparative allocation among multiple tortfeasors); but see Zeller v. Cantu, 478 N.E.2d 930, 934 
(Mass. 1985) (acknowledging the “strong policy arguments support[ing] the apportionment of 
damages between joint tortfeasors on the basis of their relative degrees of fault” but holding that 
Massachusetts law is committed to a pro rata contribution system).  In modified systems that elect 
to use the comparative-fault approach to allocate responsibility among tortfeasors, a further 
question arises: Is a tortfeasor who seeks contribution barred at the same level of fault that would 
bar a plaintiff?  See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 653 P.2d 96 (Haw. 
1982) (answering no). 
 4. Fields of liability include negligence, strict liability, intentional torts, and nuisance.  
Subfields include bailment, breach of fiduciary duty, informed consent, misrepresentation, 
negligence per se, and professional malpractice.  In each of these types of cases, whether and how 
to use a comparative fault approach entail tough questions. 
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very simple.  It is well expressed in England’s Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act of 1945: 
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and 
partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that 
damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the 
damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to 
such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the 
claimant’s share in the responsibility of the damage.5 
In a bench-trial jurisdiction, something like the foregoing is all that needs 
to be said.6  In adopting a comparative fault system for maritime personal 
injury cases, the Supreme Court in The Max Morris simply stated that “in cases 
of marine torts, courts of admiralty [can] exercise a conscientious discretion, 
and give or withhold damages upon enlarged principles of justice and equity.”7  
This provided ample guidance for the trial judge in The Lackawanna (the first 
reported case applying the new system),8 who determined that a ferry 
passenger who “heedless[ly]” fell into an open coal hole in the deck should 
have his damages reduced by 2/3 because the ferry’s negligence in leaving the 
hole unguarded “was less deserving of condemnation than the passenger’s 
obvious carelessness in going into easily discoverable danger.”9 
Probably because of the viewpoint that juries should not be entrusted with 
a broad-sounding “justice and equity” mandate,10 early formulations of the 
comparative fault approach in jury-trial systems tended to take a slightly 
different form.  Mississippi’s 1910 enactment is typical: 
[I]n all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where such injuries 
have resulted in death, the fact that the person injured may have been guilty of 
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be 
 
 5. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 George 6, c. 28, § 1 (Eng.) 
(emphasis added). 
 6. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 504, 508, 1025 (2000) (criticizing the 
APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT for an overly elaborate formulation of factors to be considered 
in assessing relative fault and for departing from the orthodox view that the appropriate 
comparison is fault, i.e., culpability, and not “causation” or “responsibility”).  Cf. Sandford v. 
Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624, 644 (Or. 1982) (Peterson, J., concurring) (objecting 
to the majority’s effort to specify a process for comparing a plaintiff’s negligence and a product 
defendant’s strict liability and stating that “jurors have been equal to that task, possibly without 
benefit of rational definition or standard, and until the issue arises, I would do nothing and say 
nothing”). 
 7. 137 U.S. 1, 13 (1890). 
 8. David R. Owen & J. Marks Moore, III, Comparative Negligence in Maritime Personal 
Injury Cases, 43 LA. L. REV. 941, 943 (1983). 
 9. The Lackawanna, 151 F. 499, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). 
 10. For a radically differing viewpoint, see the Maine statute quoted infra note 30. 
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diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person injured.11 
The basic principle here, damages reduction in proportion to victim fault, is 
replicated in the 1908 Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),12 the 1920 
Jones Act,13 the 1920 Death on the High Seas Act14 and several early state 
statutes.15  This principle is no different in content from the “justice and 
equity” formulation of the Law Reform Act and The Max Morris.  Because it is 
obvious that fault is a quality, not a quantity, it is equally obvious that the 
recurrent statutory term proportion must take its everyday English-language 
meaning—“the comparative relation in size, amount, etc. between things”16—
rather than any precise mathematical meaning.17  Thus, the difference between 
 
 11. Natchez & S. R. Co. v. Crawford, 55 So. 596, 597 (Miss. 1911) (quoting Miss. Acts 
1910, ch. 135, p.125).  The statute, essentially unchanged, is presently codified as MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972). 
 12. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1994) provides that “damages shall be diminished by the jury in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to [the injured railroad] employee.” 
 13. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1994), granted seamen a negligence action 
against their employers and incorporated FELA by reference. 
 14. 46 U.S.C. app. § 766 (1994) provides that “the court shall take into consideration the 
degree of negligence attributable to the decedent and reduce the recovery accordingly.” 
 15. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1995) (enacted in 1913) (providing that if the plaintiff’s 
negligence was slight and the defendant’s gross, “the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall 
be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of 
contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff”), quoted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 71-
72 and in WOODS & DEERE, supra note 1, at 86.  South Dakota “adopted identical legislation” in 
1941.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 72.  See also WIS. STAT. § 331.045 (1931) (retaining the 
contributory negligence defense for cases in which the victim’s fault was equal to or greater than 
the defendant’s and otherwise tracking the Mississippi language calling for damages diminution 
“by the jury in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable” to the victim), quoted in 
Richard V. Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 WIS. L. REV. 289, 289 (1941).  
In 1955, Arkansas enacted the “Prosser Act” (drafted by Dean William L. Prosser), which 
provided for the diminution of damages “in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable” 
to the victim and called for special verdicts stating the amount of total damages and “[t]he extent 
to which such damages are diminished by reason of contributory negligence.”  The Prosser Act 
lasted only two years.  See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 1, at 20-21, for the story. 
 16. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 472 (3d ed. 1990). 
 17. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 507 (stating that degree-of-fault assignments are always 
“rough estimate[s]”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 1,  at 352 (“The process is not allocation of physical 
causation, which could be scientifically apportioned, but rather of allocating fault, which cannot 
be scientifically measured.”) (emphasis in original); DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 421 (2d ed. 1998) (“It is not possible to articulate an algorithm by which a 
jury can determine percentages of responsibility.”); John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several 
Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors Be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193, 205 (1986) (“[T]he 
[fault-allocating] decision is essentially a judgmental one, affected by a number of objective, 
intuitive, intellectual, and emotional factors.  As a result, percentages are approximations.”); 
Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. M/V Maryland Clipper, 599 F.2d 1313, 1315 (4th Cir. 1979) (“While 
many times this allocation of fault cannot be made with absolute mathematical precision, still 
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the “just and equitable” criterion and the “proportionate” criterion for 
diminution of damages should be seen as purely cosmetic. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF A PERCENTAGE-FAULT VOCABULARY 
Present-day analysts tend to think of comparative fault as necessarily 
entailing the use of percentages to express the parties’ relative degrees of 
fault.18  But as we have just seen, early comparative fault systems did not use 
the language of percentages.  None of the early comparative fault statutes did 
so.  Nor did the early courts in applying these statutes.  Instead, they either 
simply elicited victim-fault-diminished general verdicts of damages19 or—if 
more control over and reviewability of the jury’s conclusions was desired—
verdicts showing both full damages and fault-diminished damages.20 
We owe the present dominance of the percentage-fault vocabulary to 
Wisconsin,21 whose long experience with the use of special verdict procedures 
 
some numerical approximation of the proportionate degrees of fault must be made to enable the 
district court to apportion damages and to enable an appellate court to review the district court’s 
decision intelligently.”); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ill. 1981) (“Although it is admitted 
that percentage allocations of fault are only approximations, the results are far superior to the ‘all 
or nothing’ results of the contributory negligence rule.”); McGuiggan v. Hiller Bros., 245 N.W. 
97, 99 (Wis. 1932) (“[N]egligent acts differ in kind and quality, and we know of no legal 
yardstick by which we can classify, evaluate, and compare them.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Christopher Dove, Dumb as a Matter of Law: The “Superseding Cause” 
Modification of Comparative Negligence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 493, 494 (2000) (“In many states the 
legislature or judiciary eventually replaced the common-law contributory negligence scheme with 
a brand-new comparative negligence system, under which damages are apportioned using a 
percentage system.”); Owen & Moore, supra note 8, at 943.  See also supra note 9 and 
accompanying text (discussing The Lackawanna where the court reduced plaintiff’s damages by 
two-thirds, as “the first [case] to apportion fault on a percentage basis in a maritime personal 
injury case”). 
 19. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114 (1913) (affirming a general 
verdict for a negligent plaintiff in a FELA case); Natchez & S.R. Co. v. Crawford, 55 So. 596, 
597 (Miss. 1911) (quoting instruction to jury that “if the jury believe from the evidence that the 
plaintiff in his conduct has been guilty of contributory negligence, then the sum total of the 
damages he would otherwise be entitled to shall be diminished in proportion of the amount of 
negligence attributable to him”). 
 20. See, e.g., Long v. Payne, 190 N.Y.S. 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921) (FELA case in which 
jury made findings of full damages as well as of victim-fault-diminished damages).  See also the 
“Prosser Act,” supra note 15 (requiring the special verdict to reflect a dollar reduction of damages 
rather than fault percentages); Campbell, supra note 15, at 292 (“Should the jury be instructed to 
compute the reduction of the damages or to return it in terms of percentages?  It has been 
customary under the comparative negligence acts of other jurisdictions [than Wisconsin] to have 
the jury write in the diminished [damages] amount.”). 
 21. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 1; WOODS & DEERE, supra note 1.  The Schwartz 
and Woods comparative fault treatises both discuss Wisconsin’s long commitment to the use of 
special verdicts, but neither focuses on the evolution of the percentage vocabulary.  Nor does the 
APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, which simply states that “[b]y convention . . . percentages 
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in torts cases led its courts as early as 1920 to submit FELA cases to juries in a 
form calling for percentage-fault assignments.22  Although neither FELA23 nor 
the comparative fault statute that the Wisconsin legislature enacted in 193124 
used the language of percentages, the Wisconsin courts’ experience with FELA 
cases had inured them to the use of percentage-assignment special verdicts, 
and they immediately began implementing the state’s new comparative fault 
statute by asking juries to return their assessment of the parties’ fault in 
percentage terms.25 
Requiring the jury to express its victim-fault-based reduction of damages 
in percentage terms is seen as a good way to focus the jury’s attention and to 
provide a handle for trial and appellate review of its findings.26  The highly 
influential Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which came out in 1977, gave the 
approach a big shove toward domination by mandating special jury 
interrogatories (and special findings in bench-tried cases) assigning fault 
percentages to the parties and to settling tortfeasors.27  Since then, most of the 
judicial adoptions of comparative fault28 and most of the more recent 
comparative fault statutes29 have either required or sought to encourage the use 
 
assigned by the fact-finder . . . add to 100 percent.”  APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 
1, § 7 cmt. g. 
 22. See, e.g., Richter v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 186 N.W. 616 (Wis. 1922); Kalashian 
v. Hines, 177 N.W. 602 (Wis. 1920). 
 23. See supra note 12. 
 24. See supra note 15. 
 25. See, e.g., Mullen v. Larson-Morgan Co., 249 N.W. 67 (Wis. 1933).  See generally 
Campbell, supra note 15, at 292-93. 
 26. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 369-72, 396-97 (discussing the advantages of special 
verdicts and interrogatories); Honore v. Ludwig, 247 N.W. 335, 337 (Wis. 1933) (indicating that 
“the use of questions based on percentages will serve better than more general questions” to focus 
and control the jury). 
 27. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 13 U.L.A. 135-36 (1977) (amended 
1979). 
 28. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992); Hilen v. Hays, 673 
S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 
N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981); Bradley v. Appalachian 
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 
(Mich. 1979). 
 29. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.080 (Michie 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 
(West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1991); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 6-802 (1990); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 
(West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1993); LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1812 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702-703 (1993); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2315.19 (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.480 (1993); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 33.003 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4.22.070 (West 1988). 
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of special verdicts that include percentage-fault assignments to the parties and 
other relevant actors. 
The translation of “in proportion” damages reduction to percentage-based 
damages reduction is so easy and obvious as to sometimes seem irresistible.30  
Thus, arguing in 1957 for the retention of the contributory negligence doctrine, 
future Justice Lewis Powell quickly fell into the vocabulary of percentages in 
discussing the “rule of comparative negligence” that he believed would be 
anathema in America.31  Similarly, Judge Henry Woods—who prefers general-
verdict submissions of comparative fault cases,32—assumes that a properly 
instructed jury under the Arkansas statute that requires the reduction of 
damages “in proportion to the degree of [the victim’s] fault”33 would be told to 
reduce damages “by the percentage of plaintiff’s own negligence.”34  Similar 
assumptions permeate the comparative fault literature35 and case law.36  
Perhaps the most striking instance appears in Professor Dan Dobbs’s fine new 
book: “The language of percentage . . . is exactly the right language for fault 
apportionment under comparative fault rules . . . .”37 
 
 30. But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 1964) (providing that the jury shall be 
instructed “to reduce the total damages by dollars and cents, and not by percentage, to the extent 
deemed just and equitable, having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the 
damages, and . . . to return both amounts with the knowledge that the lesser figure is the final 
verdict in the case”).  See also S.D. CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 20-06 (1992) 
(commenting that “it is highly improper to require the jury to indicate or specify in their verdict 
or in answer to an interrogatory the percentage of plaintiff’s contributory negligence”), quoted in 
WOODS & DEERE, supra note 1, at 438.  The Maine statute is “radically different” from other 
comparative fault statutes.  DOBBS, supra note 6, at 507 n.2.  Indeed, it is “unique.”  Wing v. 
Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 498 (Me. 1973). 
 31. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American 
Jury, 43 A.B.A. J. 1005 (1957). 
 32. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 1, at 439 (“More than thirty-five years of trial 
experience under both the pure and modified systems of comparative negligence, and having 
cases submitted on both general verdicts and interrogatories have convinced the writer that in 
many cases a general verdict is preferable.”). 
 33. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993). 
 34. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 1, at 463-64. 
 35. See supra notes 1, 18 and accompanying text. 
 36. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Fanestiel, 317 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ark. 1958) (action under the 
“Prosser Act,” supra note 15—which mandated a special verdict procedure not employing the 
language of percentages—in which jury findings of percentage negligence were elicited); Maki v. 
Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967), rev’d, 239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968) (quoting the 
FELA provision requiring the reduction of damages “in proportion” to victim fault and 
immediately thereafter launching into a discussion of hypothetical fault percentages as a way of 
explaining the provision’s meaning). 
 37. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 511. 
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III.  PERFECT LANGUAGE OR LINGUA FRANCA? 
The percentage-based approach requires the trier of fact “to apportion fault 
as if it were a tangible and measurable commodity.”38  But fault is not a 
tangible and measurable commodity; it’s a quality.39  In the words of then-
Judge Steven Breyer, “assessing ‘comparative fault’ is not so much an exercise 
in pure mathematics as it is an exercise in [normative] judgment.”40 
Moreover, the percentage-based approach treats the “commodity” of fault 
as though it had an ontological limit of 100 units for each case.41  But it takes 
only a moment’s reflection to realize that percentage-fault assignments do not 
and cannot represent some real part of some real whole.  Take a simple two-
party traffic accident case in which defendant rear-ends the plaintiff’s vehicle 
after the plaintiff comes to a sudden stop on a rainy road.  If no complications 
are introduced into the ensuing litigation, the percentage-fault 
conceptualization will posit a 100-unit universe of putatively faulty conduct 
that is limited to the two motorists’ operation of their vehicles.  But obviously 
what is included in the universe of faulty conduct is not a feature of life on 
earth but rather of a combination of the litigant’s choices and the laws of 
immunity, duty, and legal causation.  If either counsel chooses to pursue other 
avenues and the substantive law permits it, the universe of fault might well 
“expand” to include a badly designed road, an erroneous weather report, one or 
two poorly designed vehicles, bad brakes, bad tires, bad taverns, bad eyesight, 
bad medicine, etc.42 
Plainly, percentage-fault assignments are normative expressions, not 
measurements.  They provide the trier of fact with a way of “express[ing] in 
layman’s language”43 a qualitative assessment of the parties’ relative 
blameworthiness.  As such, they constitute a lingua franca, viz., a “hybrid 
language used as a medium of communication between peoples of different 
languages.”44  The law’s borrowing of mathematicians’ language for 
communicating with laymen is a three-sided lingua franca.  Like other such 
hybrids, it communicates roughly at best and fosters many 
misunderstandings.45 
 
 38. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 352. 
 39. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 40. Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 41. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
 42. I tell my students that it might even expand to include John Foster Dulles, on the view 
that everything bad that has happened in America in the last forty years stems in one way or 
another from the “domino theory” Dulles sold to President Eisenhower.  This pedagogical ploy 
no longer works; students these days have never heard of Dulles. 
 43. Lovesee v. Allied Dev. Corp., 173 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Wis. 1970). 
 44. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 760 (1981). 
 45. See 2 JOHN HOLM, PIDGINS AND CREOLES 554 (1989) (referring to “reduced linguistic 
explicitness” and “greater reliance on context” as typical features of hybrid languages). 
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IV.  FIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS46 
1. Taking percentage-fault assignments as cause-in-fact expressions 
Any jurisdiction that decides to adopt a comparative-fault approach to 
allocating responsibility among multiple tortfeasors will soon thereafter face 
the question whether to retain the doctrine of joint and several liability.  That’s 
a genuinely hard question.47  But it can be made to seem easy if one 
erroneously assumes that percentage-fault assignments represent cause-in-fact 
shares of the loss.  In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply¸48 the plaintiff 
suffered serious personal injuries when her car was rear-ended by the 
defendant’s truck after the plaintiff was forced to slam on her brakes to avoid 
colliding with a negligently-maneuvered vehicle in front of her.  The driver of 
the lead vehicle was unidentified.  The trial court instructed the jury to “decide 
how much each party [including the unidentified driver] was at fault,” and the 
jury returned findings of plaintiff 0%, defendant 30%, and unknown driver 
70%.49  Accepting the defendant’s argument that its liability should be 
restricted to 30% of the damages because in a pure comparative fault system 
like New Mexico’s, joint and several liability is “obsolete,”50 the court first 
paraphrased the jury’s finding of 30% fault to mean that “defendant’s 
negligence contributed to the accident . . . to the extent of 30%”51 and then 
simply announced its conclusion that defendant could not justly be held for 
more than 30% because the defendant “caused [only] 30% of the damage.”52  
Inasmuch as it was plain that the plaintiff had suffered an indivisible injury as 
a result of the defendant’s conduct, it is hard to imagine that the Bartlett court 
 
 46. These are all misunderstandings in the sense that they instantiate conceptual confusion.  
Whether the below-cited sources actually misunderstood—or instead made tricky rhetorical 
choices—cannot be known. 
 47. The APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT devotes over half of its 338 pages to it, exploring 
the implications of retaining full joint and several liability, of completely abolishing the doctrine, 
and of three intermediate positions.  APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 10-17, 
A18-19, B18-19, C18-21, D18-19, E18-19.  For a good summary of both sides of the basic 
argument, see generally American Motorcycle Ass’n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978). 
 48. 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). 
 49. Bartlett, 646 P.2d at 580. 
 50. Id. at 585. 
 51. Id. at 580. 
 52. Id. at 584. 
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actually thought it was talking about cause in fact.53  But that’s what it said, 
thereby excusing itself from a difficult debate.54 
2. Trying to use percentage-fault assignments to carve up legal (proximate) 
causation 
Until 1975, in ship collision cases United States admiralty courts applied a 
“divided damages” rule whereby damages were apportioned on a pro rata (50-
50) rather than degree-of-fault basis.  In United States v. Reliable Transfer 
Co.,55 the Supreme Court abandoned the divided damages system and brought 
our ship-collision law into line with the pure comparative fault system that has 
long been used in other major maritime nations and in maritime personal injury 
cases in this country. 
The pro rata system produced unpalatable results in situations in which one 
of the ships was guilty of far greater fault than the other, leading the courts to 
invent a bevy of ameliorative doctrines whereby the greater offender could 
 
 53. See American Motorcycle Ass’n, 578 P.2d 899, 905 (“[T]he mere fact that it may be 
possible to assign some percentage figure to the relative culpability of one negligent defendant as 
compared to another does not in any way suggest that each defendant’s negligence is not a 
proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury.”). 
 54. The Bartlett mistake happens frequently and in high places.  In United States v. Reliable 
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 399 (1975), the Court quoted the trial judge’s explanation that he 
assigned 25% fault to the Coast Guard and 75% to the involved vessel because “the fault [i.e., 
blameworthiness] of the vessel was more egregious” and then proceeded to state: “The District 
Court found that the vessel’s grounding was caused 25% by the failure of the Coast Guard to 
maintain the breakwater light and 75% by the fault of the Whalen.”  See also Cent. State Transit 
& Leasing Corp. v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc., 206 F.3d 1373, 1375 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that the 
trier of fact’s assignment of 75% fault to one tortfeasor and 25% to another meant that the 
“district court attributed 75% of the damage to [one] and 25% of the damage to [the other]”); 
Carroll v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Tenn. 2000) (interpreting a jury’s assignment of 100% 
fault to two immune nonparties to mean that the defendants—whose conduct indisputably was a 
cause in fact of the fatality in suit—“were in no way responsible for [the] death”); Slack v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280, 284 (Colo. 2000) (stating that the abolition of joint and several 
liability results in a system “wherein a tortfeasor is responsible only for the portion of the 
damages that he or she caused”); Bhinder v. Sun Co., 717 A.2d 202, 210 (Conn. 1998) 
(concluding that “precluding the defendant from allocating fault [to a nonparty intentional 
tortfeasor] is inconsistent with the principle of comparative negligence that a defendant should be 
liable only for that proportion of the damages for which he or she was responsible” and citing—
out of context—W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 345 (5th 
ed. 1984), which is a discussion of cause in fact); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 
1973) (explaining the core principle of comparative fault to mean that “[w]hen the negligence of 
more than one person contributes to the occurrence of an accident, each should pay the proportion 
of the total damages he has caused the other party”); Walton v. Tull, 356 S.W.2d 20, 26 (Ark. 
1962) (stating that Arkansas’s modified version of comparative fault “den[ies] a recovery to a 
plaintiff whose own negligence was at least 50 per cent of the cause of his damage”). 
 55. 421 U.S. 397 (1975). 
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sometimes be held liable for all of the damages.56  Not surprisingly, in the 
wake of Reliable Transfer the lower courts began jettisoning these doctrines, 
on the view that the pure comparative fault system makes them unnecessary. 
One such lower court decision was Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 
in which a subrogated cargo insurer sought damages for goods lost when a tug 
and barge foundered at sea.57  The trial judge attributed the loss to the 
combined fault of the stevedoring company that loaded the cargo, the barge 
owner, and the towboat company,58 and held the stevedore liable for a 
proportionate share of the damages.59  On appeal, the stevedore argued for 
exoneration on the view that its own fault was eclipsed by the later and 
arguably more dramatic fault of the barge and tug under “the doctrines of 
intervening cause and last clear chance.”60  This argument got short shrift from 
the court: 
The doctrines of intervening cause and last clear chance, like those of ‘major-
minor’ and ‘active-passive’ negligence, operated in maritime collision cases to 
ameliorate the harsh effects of the so-called ‘divided damages’ rule, under 
which damages were divided evenly between negligent parties.  In 1975, 
however, the Supreme Court [in Reliable Transfer] rejected the ‘divided 
damages’ rule, replacing it with a system of ‘proportional fault.’ . . . Under a 
‘proportional fault’ system, no justification exists for applying the doctrines of 
intervening negligence and last clear chance. Unless it can truly be said that 
one party’s negligence did not in any way contribute to the loss, complete 
apportionment between the negligent parties, based on their respective degrees 
of fault, is the proper method for calculating and awarding damages in 
maritime cases.  The doctrines of intervening negligence and last clear chance 
should not be used to circumvent this ‘proportional fault’ concept.61 
 
 56. These included a “major/minor fault” rule, an “active/passive negligence” rule, a 
“condition not cause” rule, and an “intervening negligence/last clear chance” rule.  See FRANK L. 
MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 176-78 (4th ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter NUTSHELL]; see also Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 765 F.2d 1069, 1075 
(11th Cir. 1985). 
 57. 765 F.2d. 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1985).  The tug, barge, stevedore and shipper initially 
made counterclaims and cross-claims against each other, but by the time the case went to trial, the 
cargo insurer was “the only remaining party-plaintiff.”  Id. 
 58. Id.  The trial court also assigned fault to the shipper of the goods and held that the 
plaintiff insurer as subrogee could not recover against the shipper, its own subrogor.  Id.  This 
decision was not appealed. 
 59. Id.  The other two defendants were protected by contractual exonerations, and the trial 
court properly treated the fault assigned to them as though it had been assigned to settling 
tortfeasors.  See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 210 n.10 (1994) (approving the 
treatment of a pre-accident contractual exoneration as a “quasi settlement”). 
 60. Hercules, 765 F.2d at 1075. 
 61. Id. at 1075 (citations omitted). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] ESCHEWING ERSATZ PERCENTAGES 841 
Reliable and Hercules set the stage for one of the Supreme Court’s most 
remarkable admiralty decisions.  In Exxon Company v. Sofec, Inc.¸62 Exxon 
sought to recover the damages it incurred when the defendants’ defective 
“Single Point Mooring System” (an apparatus designed to allow tanker ships to 
pump oil into a pipeline through floating hoses) caused the Exxon Houston to 
break away and go adrift during a storm, trailing a broken hose that severely 
restricted the ship’s maneuverability.63  For almost three hours the Houston’s 
master fought to save the ship, eventually accidentally running the ship 
aground on a well-charted reef after failing to plot the ship’s position.64  The 
trial judge conducted a bifurcated trial in which the fault of the Houston 
master—i.e., the plaintiff’s own fault—was tried first and separately from any 
issue of the fault of the defendants.65  At the conclusion of this extraordinary 
proceeding, the trial judge determined that the plaintiff’s fault was so 
egregious as to constitute the “sole proximate cause” of the loss.66  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed,67 and Exxon persuaded the Supreme Court to grant a writ of 
certiorari. 
In pure comparative fault systems, a defendant’s effort to designate the 
plaintiff’s faulty conduct as the sole proximate (legal) cause of the harm is 
generally viewed as “a transparent effort to circumvent” the law of 
comparative fault.68  But this was not the approach that Exxon took in the 
Sofec case in the Supreme Court.69  Instead—relying centrally on Hercules, a 
case that as we have just seen did not even present a victim-fault issue—Exxon 
argued broadly that the full effects of Reliable could only be achieved by 
 
 62. 517 U.S. 830 (1996).  The case is perceptively analyzed in Dove, supra note 18. 
 63. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 832-33. 
 64. Id. at 833. 
 65. Id. at 835. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 54 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 830 (1996). 
 68. Justice v. CSX Transp., Inc., 908 F.2d 119, 124 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.); see also 
DOBBS, supra note 6, at 526 (indicating that holding that the plaintiff’s fault supersedes the 
defendant’s on legal cause grounds frequently amounts to “discard[ing] the comparative fault 
apportionment system”); David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary of Negligence Law: Continuing 
Causation Confusion, 58 LA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1997) (characterizing a group of such cases as having 
reinstituted a rule of “contributory negligence for the fully feckless”). 
 69. At two points in its original merits brief, Exxon did note that the decision below 
“resuscitated [or resurrected] contributory negligence as a complete defense,” but the point was 
buried within the much broader line of argument.  See Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, Exxon Co. 
v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (No. 95-129), available at 1996 WL 4044, at *21, *32.  
Exxon’s reply brief did not mention the narrower point at all.  See generally Petitioners’ Reply 
Brief on the Merits, Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (No. 95-129), available at 
1996 WL 84600.  At oral argument, Justice Breyer appeared to invite Exxon’s counsel to say that 
in a pure comparative fault system, a plaintiff’s own negligence cannot be a superseding cause, 
but counsel seemed to decline the invitation.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Exxon Co. v. 
Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (No. 95-129), available at 1996 WL 128268, at *14-*16. 
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replacing the entire doctrine of proximate (legal) causation with a system in 
which a particular actor’s place in the chain of legal causation would be 
reflected in percentage-fault or percentage-responsibility assignments.70  The 
unanimous Court found this broad argument unpersuasive: 
There is nothing internally inconsistent in a system that apportions damages 
based upon comparative fault only among tortfeasors whose actions were 
proximate causes of an injury.71 
The Court signaled its awareness that the cause which in its view superseded 
the effects of the Sofec defendants’ fault was the faulty conduct of the 
plaintiff,72 but there is no indication that its attention was ever directed to the 
tension between its holding and the central premise of pure comparative fault, 
viz., that even an egregiously negligent plaintiff is entitled to a small fraction of 
his damages.73  Exxon’s strategy of trying to persuade the Court to use 
percentage assignments to carve up and parcel out “aliquot shares” of legal 
causation74 has produced an unavoidably high-profile decision that in the view 
of perceptive commentators is “inconsistent with the maritime law preference 
for comparative fault.”75 
 
 70. Dove, supra note 18, at 514, deduces from the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court 
opinions in Sofec that “Exxon’s major contention . . . was that the entire proximate cause doctrine 
should be eliminated in the admiralty context.”  The briefs and oral argument, supra note 69, 
fully confirm the deduction.  See Petitioners’ Reply Brief on the Merits, 1996 WL 84600, at *9 
(“The objectives of general admiralty law are not to relieve wrongdoers from their aliquot shares 
of the losses from marine casualties caused in fact by their misconduct . . . .”). 
 71. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 837. 
 72. See id. at 835 (stating that “the District Court found that Captain Coyne’s (and by 
imputation, Exxon’s) extraordinary negligence was the superseding and sole proximate cause of 
the Houston’s grounding”). 
 73. Judge Posner’s opinion for the court in Brotherhood Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., emphasizes and cites cases holding that in a pure system, “if the plaintiff’s 
negligence is deemed 99 percent responsible for the accident . . . and the defendant’s negligence 
1 percent responsible, the plaintiff is entitled to 1 percent of its damages.”  985 F.2d 323, 325 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
 74. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits, 1996 WL 84600, at *9. 
 75. NUTSHELL, supra note 56, at 156.  The idea that comparative fault percentage 
assignments can be used to reflect an actor’s place in the skein of legal causation did not originate 
with Exxon’s appellate counsel.  It permeates the literature.  See, e.g., APPORTIONMENT 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 8 (using the terminology of “percentages of responsibility” in lieu 
of “percentages of fault” and including among the recommended “[f]actors for assigning 
percentages of responsibility . . . the strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-
creating conduct and the harm”); UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(b) (1977) (providing 
that “[i]n determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of 
the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the 
damages claimed”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 92-105 (general discussion of the viewpoint); 
WOODS & DEERE, supra note 1, at 97-120 (general discussion of the viewpoint). 
  Despite the number of authorities who are sympathetic to the use of comparative fault 
assignments to reflect legal cause considerations, the idea seems unwise.  Professor Dobbs is 
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3. Siphoning the lion’s share of fault out of the case76 
The new Restatement (Third) of Torts-Apportionment of Liability ascribes 
it to “convention” that the trier of fact’s percentage-fault assignments must 
total 100.77  But anyone who believes that percentage-fault assignments are 
real percentages—or even that they should be treated as though they are real—
is likely to insist that the limit to 100 units of fault is not merely conventional 
but definitional.78 
An unyielding 100-unit limitation is problematic.  Many judges believe 
that accurate fault apportionment “cannot be achieved unless that 
apportionment includes all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either 
causing or contributing to the occurrence in question, whether or not they are 
parties to the case.”79  In courts holding this view,80 fault percentages assigned 
 
doubtless right in stating that “add[ing] a comparison of causal significance to the ordinary 
negligence case . . . [would require] a whole new conceptual apparatus” and that “cause in fact 
and proximate cause . . . [should retain their traditional role as] gatekeeping concepts.”  DOBBS, 
supra note 6, at 509-10. 
 76. Although lions do drink, this subtitle will be seen as a mixed metaphor.  My excuse is 
that it captures the key language of the two main cases in this subsection. 
 77. See APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7 cmt g. 
 78. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 920 (2d college ed. 1982) defines “percentage” as 
“[a] fraction or ratio with 100 fixed and understood as the denominator.”  See also Bradley v. 
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979) (“We do state what may be the 
obvious, that the sum of the negligence of all the parties to a given accident cannot exceed 100 
percent.”); Paul A. LeBel, Reducing the Recovery of Avoidable “Seat Belt Damages:” A Cure for 
the Defects of Waterson v. General Motors Corporation, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 4, 19 (1991) 
(“By definition, of course, a ‘percentage’ is a particular share of one hundred.”). 
 79. Gauthier v. O’Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 830 (La. 1993) (quoting Pocatello Ind. Park Co. v. 
Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399, 403 (Idaho 1980)).  See also id. at 833 (Lemmon, J., concurring) 
(stating that “a jury which is required to quantify the fault of all parties whose blameworthiness is 
shown on the record has a less complex task and is more likely to reach a more accurate result”); 
Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1090 (Utah 1998) (Russon, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the 
majority’s refusal to allow the assignment of a fault percentage to the unknown assailant who 
attacked the plaintiff on defendants’ premises and stating that unless the fact finder can “allocate 
to the intentional tortfeasor who undisputedly injured plaintiff, his respective proportion of 
fault . . . [the fact finder cannot] fairly and honestly determine the proportion of fault attributable 
to the other defendants in this case”). 
   The foregoing viewpoint is widely held, but it is puzzling.  The majority opinion in Field 
sets forth a much more plausible account of the fact-finding process: 
We can imagine situations where the conduct of an unknown tortfeasor would [need to] 
be ‘considered’ by a court in determining the relevant percentages of fault attributable to a 
plaintiff and a defendant, but [a percentage of] fault [need] not be attributed to such an 
unknown tortfeasor.  For example, an erratic driver might cause a defendant who was 
negligently following too closely to swerve and hit another car whose driver was 
negligently driving too fast.  In apportioning fault between the defendant who was 
following too closely and the plaintiff who was speeding and who was hit, the court might 
consider the fault of the erratic driver (who drove on and was never identified or made a 
party to the litigation) in determining the relative fault of the plaintiff and the defendant.  
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to nonparties,81 to judgment-proof intentional tortfeasors82 or to immune 
tortfeasors83 can use up the available scale of measurement, so that there is not 
enough left to permit the trier of fact to express a meaningful assessment of the 
fault of the plaintiff and defendant(s).  Judges occasionally complain about 
this.84  For example, then-Judge Breyer wondered why triers of fact should be 
required “to reduce, perhaps to inconsequential levels, . . . serious fault [of 
defendants], simply because [others] also failed to take proper care.”85  
Similarly, in deciding not to allow a percentage-fault assignment to a rapist 
who was enabled to attack the plaintiff because the defendant apartment 
complex did not supply the security measures it advertised and promised its 
tenants, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted: 
Southmark, who by definition acted unreasonably under the circumstances in 
breaching their duty to the plaintiff, should not be allowed to benefit at the 
innocent plaintiff’s expense by an allocation of fault to the intentional 
tortfeasor. . . .  Given the fact that any rational juror will apportion the lion’s 
share of the fault to the intentional tortfeasor . . . application of comparative 
fault principles in the circumstances presented in this particular case would 
operate to reduce the incentive of the lessor to protect against the same type of 
situation occurring again in the future.  Such a result is clearly contrary to 
public policy.86 
In Pepper v. Star Equipment, Ltd., the Supreme Court of Iowa referred to 
the problem under discussion as “fault siphoning.”87  Holding that a trial judge 
 
Nevertheless, . . . the court’s allocation of fault to the plaintiff and the defendant [should] 
equal 100%, the absent driver’s conduct being ‘considered’ only in determining whether 
the split between the plaintiff and the defendant should be 50/50, 60/40, or some other 
proportion. 
Field, 952 P.2d at 1081. 
 80. For discussion of the varying positions on whose fault should be quantified, see DOBBS, 
supra note 6, at 532-34, 1088-89. 
 81. See, for example, Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 646 P.2d 579, 580 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1982), in which the defendant received a 30% assessment (and hence with the abolition of 
joint and several liability owed only 30% of the damages) only because the unknown driver got a 
70% assignment.  Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Ozaki v. Association of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998) 
(assessing fault as follows: 92% to murderer, 5% to victim, 3% to negligent owner of apartment 
complex); Weidenfeller v. Star and Garter, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (assessing 
fault as follows: 75% to assailant, 5% to victim, 20% to negligent tavern). 
 83. See, for example, Carroll v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14 (Tenn. 2000), in which medical 
malpractice defendants escaped all liability solely because the jury made 70% and 30% fault 
assignments to two immune state-employed physicians who were not parties to the lawsuit. 
 84. See infra note 115 (in addition to the authorities treated immediately below). 
 85. Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 86. Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 719 (La. 1994) (original 
emphasis on “innocent” omitted, emphasis added). 
 87. 484 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1992). 
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erred in allowing a products liability defendant to implead—purely for fault-
apportionment purposes—a third party defendant who was protected from 
liability by federal bankruptcy laws, the Court stated, “the presence of a third-
party defendant in an action [should not be allowed to] siphon off a portion of 
aggregate fault from the defendant against whom the plaintiff is claiming.”88  
A dissenting judge insisted that, by refusing to allocate some of the available 
100 units to the immune third party defendant, the majority was imposing 
“fault avulsion” on the defendant.89  (“Avulsion” is “[t]he removal by erosion 
of soil from one property onto another.”90)  The Iowa Court’s “siphoning” 
(unnatural removal) vs. “avulsion” (unfair piling on) metaphors are colorful 
but not instructive.  The percentage vocabulary’s insistence that the trier of fact 
must “apportion [a 100-unit universe of] fault as if it were a tangible and 
measurable commodity”91 is deeply obscurant here.  The real question in 
Pepper was the defendant’s “just and equitable” share of the plaintiff’s 
personal injury damages.  Talking about how to parcel out an arbitrarily-
rationed 100 units of fault is not a good way to address or even to approach 
this question.92 
4. Jury jokes 
Only a handful of reported cases discuss what factors a jury should 
consider in quantifying tortfeasors’ and victims’ fault,93 and for the most part 
these discussions are not helpful.94  Typically, we simply leave it to the jury to 
answer questions like the following, which is taken from a Wisconsin traffic 
accident case involving one plaintiff and two defendants:95 
QUESTION NO. 7 
If you find by your answers to any subdivisions of Questions No. 1 and 3 that 
either the defendant [A] or the defendant [B], or both, were negligent, and if 
you further find by your answers to any subdivisions of Questions No. 2 and 4 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 159 (Snell, J., dissenting). 
 90. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 92 (1981). 
 91. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 352. 
 92. My long-ago mentor, Dean Leon Green, was fond of saying that a good legal doctrine is 
like a good horse: you can ride it to the vicinity of the problem you need to solve, and then you 
must get down and walk. 
 93. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 355 n.16 (“few decisions . . . make the attempt”).  
Noteworthy attempts include Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 591-93 (Tenn. 1994) and 
Watson v. State Farm & Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967, 973-74 (La. 1985). 
 94. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 508 (stating that such specifications are “not needed” and 
“run risks of overemphasizing particular facets of the negligence issue”); cf. Sanford v. Chevrolet 
Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624, 644 (Or. 1982) (Peterson, J., concurring) (stating that it is 
probably best to “say nothing”). 
 95. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 365. 
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that negligence of either the defendant [A] or the defendant [B] or both, was a 
cause of the collision, and if you find by your answer to any subdivision of 
Question No. 5 that the plaintiff was negligent, and if you further find by your 
answer to any subdivision of Question No. 6 that the negligence of the plaintiff 
was a cause of the collision, then answer this question: Taking the combined 
negligence which caused the collision as 100%, what percentage of such 
negligence is attributable to: 
(a) the defendant [A]? _______% 
(b) the defendant [B]? _______% 
(c) the plaintiff? _______% 
   Total: 100%96 
Even in this relatively simple three-party case, these are odd questions to put to 
a jury.  And in more complex cases—for example, cases in jurisdictions that 
call for assigning fault to nonparty tortfeasors—the complexity of the jury’s 
task can look downright funny. 
Juries sometimes go along with the joke, returning fault assignments that 
could only have been meant as parodies of precision, such as 31.06%.97  There 
has got to be a better way. 
5. Weird math 
One argument for using general verdicts in comparative fault cases stems 
from a desire to keep “horrendous mathematical processes out of sight.”98  If 
the jury returns only a dollar damages number, the court will not have to 
concern itself with the details of any ridiculous wrangling over percentages 
that may have occurred. 
A better way of reducing the visible incidence of weird math would be to 
eschew the percentage vocabulary, which contributes to various forms of 
mathematics-driven obfuscation.  The first is a recurrent mistake in 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Duncan v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 773 So. 2d 670, 674 (La. 2000), was a grade crossing 
accident case in which the jury assigned 58.6% fault to the railroad, 26.4% to the motorist, and 
15% to a governmental entity allegedly responsible for the condition of the crossing.  Upon 
determining that the governmental entity should be exonerated, the trial judge “reapportioned” the 
governmental entity’s 15% to the other two tortfeasors, yielding an assignment of 68.94% to the 
railroad and 31.06% to the motorist.  Id.  See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
653 P.2d 96, 96 (Haw. 1982) (assessing fault as follows: 52.5% to plaintiff, 47.5% to defendants); 
Riley v. Reliance Ins. Co., 703 So. 2d 158, 161 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (assessing fault as follows: 
60% to plaintiff, 23.75% to one tortfeasor, 16.25% to another); Ligon v. Middletown Area Sch. 
Dist., 584 A.2d 376 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (assessing fault as follows: 32.5% to one tortfeasor, 
67.5% to another). 
 98. David L. Nixon, The Actual “Legislative Intent” Behind New Hampshire’s Comparative 
Negligence Statute, 12 N.H. B.J. 17, 30 (1969). 
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conceptualizing the appropriate victim-fault reduction.  As we have seen, the 
basic idea of comparative fault centers on a diminution of damages “in 
proportion to the plaintiff’s relevant fault.”99  For example, in a simple two-
party case in which the defendant’s fault is expressed as 80% and the 
plaintiff’s as 20%, the plaintiff should recover his full damages less a 
20/100ths reduction.  But courts and counsel often mistake this, holding or 
contending that the damages reduction in such a case should be 20/80ths.  
Obviously, if one believes in the validity of the jury’s normative numbers, a 
20/80ths reduction would over-penalize the plaintiff.100  Yet the mistaken 
contention is persistently (and often demonstrably confusedly) made.101 
A second type of math-related mistake is simple computational error.  A 
good example is Davis v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., in which the trier 
of fact assigned 60% fault to the plaintiff, 10% to the product liability 
defendant, and 30% to the plaintiff’s employer, who was immune from tort 
liability by virtue of Louisiana’s workers’ compensation statute.102  After 
determining that under Louisiana law “an employer’s fault should not be 
considered in apportioning liability among the negligent parties,”103 the court 
decided to “reapportion” the fault that had been mistakenly assigned to the 
employer.104  So far, so good; there is plenty of authority supporting “[j]udicial 
reallocation of [fault] when an assignment of [fault] is legally erroneous.”105  
The easiest (and conceptually clearest) way to reallocate in Davis would have 
been simply to ignore the erroneous 30-unit assignment to the employer and 
hold the defendant liable for 10/70ths of plaintiff’s $125,000 in damages, 
$17,857.14.  Instead, the court did it this way: 
[The employer’s] thirty percent fault should be divided between [plaintiff] and 
[defendant] 6 to 1 which is in proportion to their previously determined 
degrees of fault.  Applying this formula, [defendant’s] proportion of the thirty 
percent fault is 4.29 percent and [plaintiff’s] is 25.71 percent.  Thus, 
 
 99. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 504. 
 100. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1913) (criticizing a jury 
instruction that called for diminution of damages “in proportion to [plaintiff’s] negligence . . . ‘as 
compared with the negligence of the defendant’” and noting that it should have said “in 
proportion to [plaintiff’s] negligence as compared with the entire negligence attributable to both 
[plaintiff and defendant]”); Cameron v. Union Auto. Ins. Co., 247 N.W. 453 (Wis. 1933) 
(rejecting defendant’s argument that a plaintiff whose negligence was assessed at 20% should 
have his damages diminished by 20/80ths). 
 101. See Ross v. Koberstein, 264 N.W. 642 (Wis. 1936) (patiently explaining to defense 
counsel—whose client was assessed with 95% fault against the plaintiff’s 5%—that defendant 
was helped, not hurt, by the trial judge’s mistaken diminution of damages by 5/95ths instead of 
5/100ths). 
 102. 892 F.2d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 103. Id. at 384. 
 104. Id. 
 105. APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. h.  See also supra note 97. 
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[defendant] is responsible [for its previously determined 10 percent plus an 
additional 4.29 percent] for a total of 14.29 percent of [plaintiff’s] damages.106 
Under the court’s approach, defendant owed 0.1429 X $125,000 = 
$17,862.50.107  That is about five bucks too much.  The overage is trivial, but 
the existence of the mistake is important; it reflects the rounding incident to 
cumbersome mathematical processes necessitated only by a self-imposed 
enslavement to the vocabulary of percentages.108 
Self-imposed enslavement can take extreme forms.  Zenner v. Chicago, St. 
P., M. & O. Railway Co.109 was a grade crossing accident case in which the 
jury assigned the deceased motorist 40% fault and the railroad 60%.110  Under 
the jury’s findings, the railroad’s negligent conduct consisted in the trainmen’s 
failure to sound the train’s whistle and ring its bell.111  The appellate court 
determined that the evidence would not support the conclusion that the 
trainmen failed to sound the whistle and then reasoned: 
It must now be taken as a verity that defendant discharged its statutory duty 
with respect to the whistle, and failed so to do with respect to the bell.  Based 
upon its conclusion that defendant was negligent in two respects, the jury 
found defendant’s negligence to constitute 60 per cent. of the total negligence 
involved in the accident, and appraised the negligence of deceased at 40 per 
cent. . . .  [But when] the negligence of deceased is balanced against the single 
default on the part of defendant in [not ringing] the bell, we think it must be 
said . . . that the negligence of deceased as a matter of law is at least as great as 
that of defendant. . . .  If the jury could legitimately assess the percentage of 
deceased’s negligence at 40 per cent., in comparison with two distinct 
violations by defendant, there could be no rational ground for assessing his 
negligence at less than 50 per cent., with only one default by defendant 
remaining in the case.112 
 
 106. Davis, 892 F.2d at 384-85. 
 107. Id. at 385 n.7. 
 108. See also Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco, 410 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1980), in which the trier of 
fact assigned the plaintiff 41% fault, defendant Fireco 30%, and defendant Ansul (who settled 
with the plaintiff) 29%.  The appellate court determined that the assignment to the plaintiff was 
legally erroneous and then proceeded to the reallocation process: “Ansul’s 29% and Fireco’s 
30%, or 59%, constitute the total fault in the case.  In a sense, the 59% is 100%.  Thus, Fireco’s 
responsibility is 30/59ths or 50.8%. . . .  It follows that Fireco’s proportionate share of the entire 
damages of $113,400 is $57,661.01. . . .”  Id. at 685.  Note that 50.8% of $113,400 comes to only 
$57,607.20.  The court’s damages figure of $57,661.01 is exactly 30/59ths of $113,400.  Thus, 
the court actually used fractions to do it right, but it still felt enslaved enough to the percentage 
vocabulary to indulge in the somewhat misleading 50.8% expression. 
 109. 262 N.W. 581 (Wis. 1935). 
 110. Id. at 584. 
 111. Id. at 582. 
 112. Id. at 584. 
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The result of this reasoning was to bar recovery under the state’s modified 
version of comparative fault.  If the court had said only that narrowing 
defendant’s culpability from two pieces of conduct to one necessitated 
lowering defendant’s fault assignment from 60% to 50% or less, it would have 
been subject to some criticism for the formalism and sterility of resting its 
disposition on a mere counting of the parties’ negligent acts and omissions 
rather than assessing their “entirely different kind and quality.”113  But what 
the court actually said entailed the additional and far worse formalism of 
insisting that as a tortfeasor’s culpability decreases, the victim’s must of 
necessity increase.  Such reasoning posits and indeed reifies a precisely 
reciprocal relationship114 between the parties’ degrees of fault that the real 
world in no way reflects or supports.  Whether the trainmen sounded the 
whistle or not, the deceased’s conduct “remain[ed] exactly what it was.”115  
The posited precise reciprocity was a pure abstraction116 stemming entirely 
from the arbitrary limitation to a 100-unit universe of fault that is entailed in 
the percentage vocabulary. 
V.  A FAULT-LINE PROCESS FOR SETTING NORMATIVE NUMBERS 
All of the foregoing misunderstandings could be eliminated or at least 
reduced in frequency and importance by eschewing the vocabulary of 
percentages in favor of a simpler, less rigid, and less cluttered language.  The 
new language should meet the following criteria: (1) It should reflect the 
reality that reducing damages “in proportion” to the victim’s degree of fault is 
in no way a mathematical process but rather a way of seeking to arrive at each 
defendant’s “just and equitable” share of the damages; (2) It ought to make 
clear that the comparative fault process assesses “fault, not causation,”117 i.e., 
that both cause in fact and legal causation are “gatekeeping concepts”118 that 
 
 113. Campbell, supra note 15, at 290.  Professor Campbell explains: “The [process] is not one 
of simple mathematics.  A person negligent in one respect may be held as a matter of law at least 
as negligent as one found negligent in two or more respects.”  Id. at 291. 
 114. See also LeBel, supra note 78, at 7, 19 (stating that a decision assigning 80% to 
defendant’s fault in causing a traffic accident, 20% to plaintiff’s fault in causing the accident, and 
another 20% to the plaintiff for not wearing a seat belt was “fundamentally flawed as a matter of 
logic” because “[i]f the plaintiff’s negligence in failing to wear a seat belt is . . .  twenty percent, 
then there is another eighty percent of fault” that must be posited and given legal effect). 
 115. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 532 (discussing Walton v. Tull, 356 S.W.2d 20, 26-27 (Ark. 
1962), in which the court complained about the need for reducing a party’s fault assignment 
simply because other actors’ fault had to be taken into account). 
 116. In Zenner, it appeared that the deceased motorist had tried to outrace the train to the 
crossing.  Trying to outrace a whistle-sounding and bell-ringing train might under some 
circumstances be more culpable than trying to outrace a bell-ringing train.  But it might not.  The 
point is that there can legitimately be nothing automatic about any such evaluation. 
 117. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 504. 
 118. Id. at 509. 
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are not part of the comparative-fault-assessment process; (3) It must focus the 
trier of fact’s attention on “the relevant unjustified risks”119 taken by each of 
the parties rather than on the parties’ “general moral worth;”120 (4) Its 
vocabulary should not be arbitrarily rationed; and (5) It should use “the 
fundamental negligence analysis”121—without further elaboration—to assess 
each party’s responsibility for the relevant unjustified risks.  Judge Posner has 
recently set forth a crystal-clear summary of the fundamental negligence 
analysis: 
[An actor] is negligent if the burden (cost) of the precautions that he could 
have taken to avoid the accident (B [ . . . ]) is less than the loss that the accident 
could reasonably be anticipated to cause (L), discounted (i.e., multiplied) by 
the probability [P] that the accident would occur unless the precautions were 
taken.  So: B<PL.  The cost-justified level of precaution (B)—the level that the 
[actor] must come up to on penalty of being found to have violated his duty of 
due care if he does not—is thus higher, the likelier the accident that the 
precaution would have prevented was to occur (P) and the greater the loss that 
the accident was likely to inflict if it did occur (L).  Looked at from a different 
direction, the formula shows that the cheaper it is to prevent the accident (low 
B), the more likely prevention is to be cost-justified and the failure to prevent 
therefore negligent.  Negligence is especially likely to be found if B is low and 
both P and L (and therefore PL, the expected accident cost) are high.122 
These variables are assessed from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary 
prudence “who found himself or herself in [the actor’s] position.”123 
For its lexicon, the new language would abandon the vocabulary of 
percentage-fault assignments and substitute a vocabulary borrowed from a 
valuable insight of Professor Richard Pearson: It would posit “a ‘fault line,’ 
with the absence of fault at one end having a value of zero and deliberate 
wrongdoing at the other having a value of ten.”124  The trier of fact would be 
 
 119. Id. at 507. 
 120. Id. at 506.  Keeping considerations of the parties’ general moral or aesthetic 
attractiveness out of the process is perhaps the most fundamental role of the judiciary.  See 
generally David W. Robertson, Alvin Rubin’s Last Dissent, 70 TEX. L. REV. 7 (1991). 
 121. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 508. 
 122. Brotherhood Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323, 327 (7th 
Cir. 1993).  Judge Posner’s source is obviously Learned Hand’s famous opinion in United States 
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  For earlier versions of what has come 
to be called “the Hand formula,” see The Glendola, 47 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir. 1931); Henry T. 
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42-43 (1915).  In Carroll Towing, Judge Hand said he 
was speaking in “algebraic terms” but it should be noted that no one, including Hand himself 
thought that his construct was anything more than metaphorical mathematics.  In Mosian v. 
Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949), he wrote that “all such attempts [to quantify the 
variables] are illusory. . . .”  See also infra note 145. 
 123. Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.). 
 124. Richard N. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws—An 
Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343, 348-49 (1980).  Professor Pearson did not think 
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required to use this scale, consisting of whole numbers only, to communicate 
its normatively-based estimation of the extent to which each relevant actor’s125 
relevant conduct departed from what was required of that actor under the 
circumstances.126  The trier of fact’s use of the scale would yield a whole 
number from zero through ten—to be called a normative assignment—for each 
actor being adjudged.  Findings of fact would consist of (a) each successful 
plaintiff’s total damages, and (b) each relevant actor’s normative assignment. 
The trial judge’s role in comparative fault cases using the new lexicon 
would not differ in substance from her present role, but certain aspects of the 
work would become more sharply focused.  (a) Because the new lexicon does 
not ration the available numbers, the judge would have to make a principled 
decision—under the facts shown and on the basis of substantive and procedural 
law and policy—as to which actors ought to be submitted to the trier of fact for 
potential normative assignments.  (b) Once the findings of fact were made, the 
judge would then have to make a similar principled decision as to which of the 
normative assignments were relevant for purposes of determining each 
defendant’s equitable share of the damages.127  (c) The judge would then total 
the relevant normative assignments, yielding a normative denominator.  (d) 
Each defendant would then be assigned a normative fraction, the numerator of 
which would be the defendant’s normative assignment and the denominator the 
normative denominator.  (e) Each defendant’s equitable share of the damages 
would be arrived at by multiplying the total damages by the defendant’s 
normative fraction.  (f) Each defendant’s ultimate liability to the plaintiff 
 
his fault-line method should “be incorporated into a statute or . . .  into the jury instructions.”  Id 
at 349.  I do not mean to suggest that he would agree with any of my criticisms and proposals.  
But his basic insight is perfect for my purposes.  For broadly similar suggestions, see Sandford v. 
Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624, 634-35 (Or. 1982); Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 
500 (Me. 1973); LeBel, supra note 78, at 31. 
 125. I am forced to use the awkward term “relevant actor” by the fact that so many 
jurisdictions have decided to assign fault to non-party tortfeasors.  See supra note 81 and 
accompanying text.  A much preferable approach is that of the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT 
ACT (1977), which provides that numerical fault assignments should be confined to plaintiffs, 
defendants, third-party defendants and settling tortfeasors.  UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 
§ 2(a)(2), 13 U.L.A. 136 (1977). 
 126. For each negligent actor, the baseline requirement—the conduct required under the 
circumstances—would come from an application of the B < PL inquiry.  Analogous applications 
of the law of intentional tort and strict liability would set the baseline requirement for such actors.  
I realize that “what was required of [an] actor under the circumstances” ultimately begs the key 
substantive question.  But my proposed new language is neither creating nor changing (but rather 
merely identifying) that question, so I feel free to beg it. 
 127. In some jurisdictions, the judge would be required to treat each normative assignment as 
relevant.  In others—particularly those with the philosophy that accurate fact-finding requires the 
numerical assessment of the culpability of persons whose culpable contribution is not directly 
relevant to the determination of the defendants’ liability—some of the normative assignments 
would be set aside by the judge.  See supra notes 79 and 105 and accompanying text. 
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would then be determined by the jurisdiction’s law of joint and several 
liability.128 
To illustrate how the proposed system would work—and to see some of 
the simplifications that it could produce—let us posit a hypothetical case 
governed by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, the presently relevant 
features of which are:  (a) the pure form of comparative fault applies in 
negligence and strict liability cases;129 (b) intentional tort cases are not covered 
by the Act;130 (c) in cases governed by the Act, the jury must return special 
verdicts assigning percentages of fault to parties and settling tortfeasors but not 
to nonparty (sometimes called phantom) tortfeasors;131 and (d) the doctrine of 
joint and several liability is retained.132  In our hypothetical case,133 a thirteen-
year-old girl who was raped by three seventeen-year-old boys at summer camp 
sues the camp for negligent supervision and security and the three rapists for 
battery.  The trial judge instructs the jury to assign fault percentages to each of 
the four parties, and the jury finds as follows: 
Plaintiff’s total damages:    $100,000 
Plaintiff’s fault (negligence in drinking beer with the three boys): 12% 
Camp’s fault (negligent supervision, etc.): 10% 
Rapist A’s fault (battery): 38% 
Rapist B’s fault (battery): 22% 
Rapist C’s fault (battery): 18% 
We will assume that all of the findings of culpability vel non are supported by 
the facts and the law.  What should the judgment provide?  We will first 
discuss that question with the vocabulary of percentages and then turn to the 
fault-line method for a comparison. 
The first question that must be answered before entering a judgment is 
whether the percentage-fault assignments to the three battery defendants were 
appropriate.  Each opposing viewpoint has some plausibility.  (a) Some judges 
will say yes, on the view that accurate fact-finding in the case governed by the 
Act (Plaintiff vs. Camp) depends on allowing the jury to assign fault to the 
 
 128. Whether and against whom the plaintiff would be barred from recovery would be 
determined by the particular jurisdiction’s choice among the “pure,” “equal to” and “greater than” 
systems outlined supra note 2. 
 129. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 13 U.L.A. 127 (1977). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. § 2(a). 
 132. Id. § 2(c). 
 133. The basic facts and jury findings are borrowed from Morris v. Yogi Bear’s Jellystone 
Park Camp Resort, 539 So. 2d 70 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
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other tortfeasors.134  But (b) most judges will probably say no, on the view that 
cases not covered by the Act should not be subjected to its procedures, 
particularly when the Act itself precludes percentage-fault assignments to 
phantom tortfeasors. 
The next question is whether the three battery defendants should be able to 
use the percentage assignments to avoid full joint and several liability.  The 
clear answer is no; the Act specifically leaves the law of intentional tort 
undisturbed.  Each rapist should be held jointly and severally liable for 
$100,000. 
The remaining question is the camp’s exposure.  We return to the opposing 
viewpoints on the appropriateness of the percentage-fault findings against the 
rapists.  (a) A judge who believes that it was appropriate to assign fault 
percentages to the three battery defendants will presumably hold the camp 
jointly and severally liable for $88,000.  Counsel for the camp will argue 
strenuously that the case shows the injustice of joint and several liability, in all 
likelihood asking the rhetorical question: “How can my client be made to pay 
for 88% of the injury when it caused only 10% of it?”  If the judge is 
experienced and intelligent, he will respond by saying, “Nonsense, your client 
has been found to have been a cause in fact and a legal cause of the entire loss; 
otherwise, it wouldn’t be liable at all.”  If the judge is less experienced or 
intelligent, he may say, “I agree, but that’s a matter for the legislature.”  (b) A 
judge who believes that the findings were inappropriate will have to order a 
new trial or reallocate the unwanted percentages.135  The latter approach would 
yield an award of 10/22ds of plaintiff’s damages, $45,455. 
Intrinsically this is a hard case, and the percentage vocabulary adds to its 
difficulty and mystery.  Did the percentage vocabulary lead the trial judge to 
feel it necessary to submit the rapists’ percentages of fault to jury assessment?  
Did the perceived need to assign percentages to three rapists “siphon” fault 
from the camp?  From the plaintiff?  Without knowing these things, we can 
have no confidence in the fairness of any judgment. 
The case would look far simpler under the fault-line method.  In the first 
place, there would be little impetus to seek normative assignments against the 
rapists.  It seems to be only the illusion of carving up some notional 100-unit 
universe of fault that leads judges to feel it necessary to seek percentage 
assignments against phantoms.  And even if normative assignments were 
sought against the rapists, a properly instructed jury would presumably give 
them 10 each—raping a thirteen-year-old is deliberate wrongdoing—and the 
 
 134. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 135. See APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, reporter’s note to § 7 cmt. h (noting 
that a new trial, rather than reallocation, is more likely when the erroneous percentage assignment 
is large). 
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trial judge would certainly then see the wisdom of ignoring these assignments 
in considering the camp’s liability. 
Moreover, even if we make the unlikely assumption that the case is 
submitted in exactly the same posture and that the jury’s findings are fully 
consistent as to the parties’ respective degrees of fault, the case is still simpler 
under the fault-line method.  On these assumptions, the normative assignments 
in the present case will be: 
  Plaintiff  1 
  Camp  1 
  Rapist A  4 
  Rapist B  2 
  Rapist C  2 
On these findings, the rapists will again be jointly and severally liable for the 
full damages.  A judge who believes the findings against the rapists were 
appropriate will hold the camp jointly and severally liable for 9/10ths of the 
damages.  Defense counsel will be unable to make any semi-plausible 
causation arguments.  A judge who believes the findings against the rapists 
were inappropriate will order a new trial or hold the camp for 1/2. 
I think we have just seen that the fault-line method renders the Bartlett 
mistake virtually impossible,136 makes it rather obvious that normative 
numbers are not appropriate for legal cause considerations,137 eliminates the 
fault-siphoning problem,138 guarantees against parodies of precision,139 and 
cuts back on mathematical complexities.140 
Moreover, the fault-line method seems to me to take away whatever heat 
may be left in the recurrent argument that “comparing different types of 
culpability is like comparing apples and oranges”141 and hence impossible or at 
least inappropriate.142  The fault-line method reveals that debate as irrelevant 
 
 136. See supra Section IV.1. 
 137. See supra Section IV.2. 
 138. See supra Section IV.3. 
 139. See supra Section IV.4. 
 140. See supra Section IV.5.  Restricting the jury to whole single-digit numbers helps.  And I 
think fractions are easier to work with than percentages; as I remember grade school, fractions 
came right after long division and way before decimals and percentages. 
 141. APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, reporter’s note to § 8 cmt. a. 
 142. Cf. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (stating that balancing or comparing “incommensurate” interests is “like judging 
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy”); Aaron D. Twerski, The Use 
and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797, 806 (1977) 
(suggesting that “[t]he short answer to the dilemma of how one can compare strict liability and 
negligence is that one must simply close one’s eyes and accomplish the task”). 
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by making it plain that no direct conduct-comparing occurs anywhere in the 
comparative fault process.  The jury makes no such comparison; instead, it 
estimates each actor’s extent of departure from the norm appropriate to that 
actor’s situation and registers that normative estimation in numerical form.  
Regardless of whether the estimate is called a “percentage” or a “normative 
assignment,” it is plain on reflection that it does not result from comparing one 
actor’s conduct with another’s but rather from comparing each actor’s conduct 
with that actor’s own behavioral norm.  The shift from the percentage to the 
normative assignment vocabulary does not change that; it just makes it 
clearer.143  Nor does the judge compare the conduct of the parties.  Instead, she 
merely uses mathematical operations to try to give comparable effect to the 
jury’s normative assessments.  In retrospect, it is clear that we should have 
named these systems “damages apportionment” rather than “comparative 
fault.”144 
VI.  TEACHING TORTS 
The fault-line proposal could be implemented by the courts in some states, 
but in many it would require legislative action.  Meanwhile, torts professors 
should introduce their students to the proposed fault-line methodology early in 
their study of comparative fault, before the inevitable infatuation with the 
power of percentages sets in.  The big problem with the percentage vocabulary 
is that it sounds and looks like measurement but is not.  Reflecting on the fault-
line methodology makes it clear, I think, that a jury’s assignment of normative 
numbers to the actors’ conduct cannot be measured, regardless of how that 
assignment is expressed. 
We lawyers, notoriously poor at mathematical operations, seem readily 
seduced by the reality or any plausible illusion of quantification.145  While 
 
 143. Those who favor “blindfolding the jury”—i.e., trying to keep the jurors from knowing 
the legal effect of their findings—may consider that the percentage vocabulary is superior to the 
fault line method in this respect.  But the emergent—and in my opinion superior—view holds that 
blindfolding is not a good idea.  See Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 
(E.D. La. 1975) (“One of the purposes of the jury system is to temper the strict application of law 
to facts, and thus bring to the administration of justice a commonsense lay approach, a purpose 
ill-served by relegating the jury to a role of determining facts in vacuo, ignorant of the 
significance of their findings.  See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 94 (1970).”)  
Moreover, if the court doesn’t tell the jury the potential effect of their findings, they are bound to 
guess, and the guess will often be wrong.  See generally Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387 (Haw. 
1986). 
 144. Cf. Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 499 (Me. 1973) (stating that Maine’s odd statute, see 
supra note 30 and accompanying text, should clearly have been named the “Damage 
Apportionment Act”). 
 145. Judge Posner, whose work is so helpful on so many tort-law fronts, is once again 
instructive here.  In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th 
Cir. 1982), he made the helpful observation that “[t]hough mathematical in form, the Hand 
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damages numbers are real—i.e., they do honestly purport to measure 
something—ostensible percentages of fault are not real.  They are ersatz 
notional normative numbers.  Lawyers who grasp this fact at an early stage in 
their careers will be a good step ahead of the rest of the pack. 
 
 
formula does not yield mathematically precise results in practice; that would require that B, P, 
and L all be quantified, which so far as we know has never been done in an actual lawsuit.”  Id.  
But then in Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854-56 (7th Cir. 1989)—looking at the B element of 
the formula—he concluded that the “cost to [a rape victim] of schooling herself to greater 
vigilance” against an attack in defendants’ motel could rationally be set at something just less 
than 1/32d of $20,000 per year.  Id. 
